Abstract-Various decomposition of finite games have been proposed. The inner product of vectors plays a key role in the decomposition of finite games. This paper considers the effect of different inner products on the orthogonal decomposition of finite games. We find that only when the compatible condition is satisfied, a common decomposition can be induced by the standard inner product and the weighted inner product. To explain the result, we studied the existing decompositions, including potential based decomposition, zero-sum based decomposition, and symmetry based decomposition.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the widespread applications of game theory, many researchers begin studying the topological structure of finite games. Decomposition of finite games is the main technique [1] - [4] . Different decompositions are proposed from different point of views. i) Using Helmholtz decomposition theorem, [3] proposed a potential based decomposition of finite games, where the space of finite games G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is decomposed into a canonical sum of the pure potential subspace P, the non-strategic subspace N , and the pure harmonic subspace H, G [n;k1,··· ,kn] = P otential games P ⊕ Harmonic games N ⊕ H .
ii) [6] reinvestigated the potential based decomposition on Euclidean space, and bases of all subspaces in the decomposition are provided. iii) [7] proposed three kinds of decompositions of finite games: zero-sum based decomposition G [n;k1,··· ,kn] = Z ⊕ C, normalization based decomposition G [n;k1,··· ,kn] = L ⊕ E, and zero-sum equivalent potential based decomposition
where Z, C, L, E and B = (Z +E)∩(C +E) are the subspace of zero-sum games, common interest games, normalized *This work is supported partly by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) under Grants 61473099, 61773371, 61733018 and 61333001.
1 Changxi Li and Fenghua He are with Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin 150001, P. R. China changxileehit@gmail.com, hefenghua@hit.edu.cn games, non-strategic games, and zero-sum equivalent potential games, respectively. iv) Symmetry based decomposition of finite games are proposed in [8] , [9] , which is shown as follows
where S is the subspace of the symmetry games and K is the orthogonal complement of S.
As far as we know, different technical tools are used for various decompositions. For example, the technical tools used in [3] and [6] are Helmholtz decomposition theorem and semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices respectively, where different inner products for the space of games are defined. But surprisingly, [3] and [6] have provided the same decomposition (potential based decomposition) independently. Why can different inner products induce the same decomposition? Contingency or necessity? If it is a contingency, then under what conditions will the decomposition be the same using Helmholtz decomposition theorem and STP? This note aims at answering all the questions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some preliminaries including finite games theory, matrix expression of finite games. Section 3 investigates the effect of different inner products on the orthogonal decomposition of finite games. Section 4 is a brief conclusion. For statement ease, we give some notations:
S n is the set of permutations of elements of N .
II. PRELIMINARIES
This section gives a very brief review on semi-tensor product of matrices and game theory. Plese refer to [5] , [11] for more details.
A. Finite Games Definition 2.1:
A finite non-cooperative game G = {N, S, c} is a triple, where (a) N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is the set of players; (b) S = n i=1 S i is the strategy profile of the game, with S i = {1, 2, · · · , k i } as the set of strategies of player i ∈ N ; (c) c = {c 1 , . . . , c n } is the set of payoff functions, where c i : S → R is the payoff function of player i ∈ N . Denote by G [n;k1,··· ,kn] the set of finite games with |N | = n and |S i | = k i , ∀i =∈ N . There are many classes of games. The following are the definitions of some special games used in this note.
• Zero-sum games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is a zero-sum game, if and only if,
• Common interest games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is a common interest game, if and only if,
• Normalized games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is a normalized game, if and only if,
where S −i = n j=1,j =i S j .
• Potential games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is potential if and only if there is a function P (s), called the potential function, such that
• Harmonic games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is a harmonic game, if and only if, it is a zero-sum game and a normalized game, i.e.,
• Non-strategic games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is a non-strategic game, if and only if, for any i ∈ N that
• Symmetry games: a finite non-cooperative game G ∈ G [n;l,··· ,l] is a symmetry game, if and only if, for any
B. Matrix Expression of Finite Games
The tool used in this paper is the semi-tensor product (STP) of matrices [11] , which is a generalization of conventional matrix product.
Definition 2.2: Let A ∈ M m×n and B ∈ M p×q and t = lcm(n, p) be the least common multiple of n and p. The semi-tensor product (STP) of A and B is defined as A ⋉ B := A ⊗ I t/n B ⊗ I t/p ∈ M mt/n×qt/p . Identify j ∼ δ j ki , which is called the vector expression to strategies j ∈ S i . Using STP and the vector expression to strategies s i ∈ S i , i = 1, · · · , n, the strategy profile s = n i=1 s i can be expressed as s = ⋉ n i=1 s i . Under this expression, each payoff function c i becomes a mapping c i : ∆ k → R, where k = n i=1 k i . Hence for each c i we can find a unique row vector V i ∈ R k such that
V i is called the structure vector of c i (x). A finite game G ∈ G [n;k1,··· ,kn] is uniquely determined by {V i |i = 1, · · · , n}. Denote the payoff vector by
Then it is clear that G [n;k1,··· ,kn] has a natural vector space structure as R nk . To illustrate the vector expression of finite games, we provide the following example.
Example 2.3: Consider a three-player game G. Each player has two strategies S i = {1, 2}, i = 1, 2, 3, and the payoffs of G are described as in Table I . The payoff vector of G is 
III. INNER PRODUCT AND ORTHOGONAL DECOMPOSITION
Consider any two vectors X and Y in the vector space R nk . The standard inner product on Euclidean space is
For positive definite matrix Q ∈ M nk×nk , the weighted inner product is defined as follows
where Q ∈ M nk×nk is called the weight matrix of the inner product ·, · Q .
Different decompositions employ different inner products. The inner product in [3] is the weighted inner product with the weight matrix
And the inner product used in [6] and [7] is the standard inner product on Euclidean space. We will investigate under what conditions the two inner products can induce the same decomposition.
Consider a decomposition of finite games, which has the following form
where M i is the subspace of finite games, i = 1, . . . , p.
Definition 3.1: (Compatible Condition) Consider the decomposition of finite games (2) . The standard inner product and the weighted inner product with Q as its weight matrix are called compatible, if for any game G ∈ M ij with V G as its payoff vector, the games determined by V G Q and
Theorem 3.2:
A common decomposition (2) can be induced by the standard inner product and a weighted inner product simultaneously, if and only if the compatible condition is satisfied.
Proof: Suppose the decomposition (2) is induced by the standard inner product. Then for any G 1 ∈ M i1 and G 2 ∈ M i2 we have,
Consider a weighted inner product with Q as its weight matrix, we have
The first equality follows from the definition of weighted inner product, the second equality follows from the compatible condition, and the third equality follows from condition (3). Condition (4) implies that the decomposition (2) is induced by the weighted inner product.
If the decomposition (2) is induced by the weighted inner product. Then for any G 1 ∈ M i1 and G 2 ∈ M i2 we have,
Consider the standard inner product, we have
The first equality follows from the definition of standard inner product, the second and the third equality follows from the compatible condition, and the fourth equality follows from condition (5). Condition (6) implies that the decomposition (2) is induced by the standard inner product. ✷ Example 3.3: 1) Consider the potential based decomposition of finite games
According to [6] and [3] , the potential based decomposition was obtained using the standard inner product and weighted inner product (1), respectively. The reason can be explained as follows. For any potential game G = {N, S, {c i } i∈N }, the gameĜ is a weighted potential game, whereĜ is determined by the payoff vector V G Q (or V G Q −1 ). Similarly, it is easy to verify that any non-strategic game G, the game
is also non-strategic. Therefore the compatible condition is satisfied. 2) Consider the zero-sum based decomposition
Let V G ∈ Z andṼ G ∈ C be arbitrary. Then
which implies that the zero-sum based decomposition can be induced by the standard inner product. But for weighted inner product (1)
According to (7), V G ,Ṽ G Q = 0, if and only if all players have the same strategies, i.e. k i = constant, ∀i. Therefore the zero-sum based decomposition does not hold for general case. The reason is that the compatible condition is not satisfied for zero-sum based decomposition. 3) Using the compatible condition, one can verify that the symmetry based decomposition and normalization based decomposition are the same under the standard inner product and the weighted inner product (1).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper considers the effect of different inner products on the orthogonal decomposition of finite games. We find that only when the compatible condition is satisfied, a common
